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If the complex litigation in Goldwater v. Carter
provides no other clear lesson, it is a convincing
demonstration that much of the constitutional law
governing executive-legislative relations remains con-
fused and ill-defined. With the Supreme Court's refusal
to adjudicate the issue on the merits, the power to
terminate treaties is consigned to a constitutional terra
incognita where the boundaries of power must be achieved
by de facto institutional practice rather than by legal
theorizing. Whether this is a wise exercise of "the
passive virtues" is open to dispute. It is, however, the
way that the American political system has chosen to
handle a number of salient problems in executive-legisla-
tive relations--problems such as the power of the Presi-
dent under the guise of "executive privilege" to with-
hold information from Congress, the limits of presi-
dential war-making power, and a host of others. 1 Insofar
as such disputes between Congress and the Executive Branch
reach the courts, they characteristically are analyzed in
terms of jurisdictional concepts Csuch as standing,
ripeness, justiciability, and the political question
doctrine) that avoid, or at least camouflage, the under-
lying substantive issues. Yet is is not inappropriate
that these cases so often raise these jurisdictional
issues, for the core problem in such disputes is
evaluating the institutional capacities of the various
organs of the national government. 2 Indeed, reluctance
*B.A. Haverford College, 1969, M.A. Princeton University, 1971,
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1. For a provocative discussion of these and other problems in
executive-legislative relations, see Eckhardt & Black, The Tides of
Power (1976).
2. Jurisdictional concepts such as standing, ripeness, justi-
ciability, and political questions doctrine can be interpreted as
modes of analyzing the institutional competence both of the courts
and of the parties before it. See. e.g., Scharpf, Judicial Review
and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J.
517 (1966).
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to evaluate or confusion about how to evaluate the in-
stitutional capacities of Congress and the presidency
accounts for much of the incoherence of the con-
stitutional law of executive-legislative relations.
It is in this context that Franck and Weisband's
Foreign Policy by Congress is to be recommended to any
serious student of Goldwater v. Carter, for whatever
legal principles finally come to govern the power
to terminate treaties must, if they are to be viable,
be founded on the underlying realities of presidential
and congressional power. Thus such disputes must
ultimately be evaluated in light of how good Congress
actually is at making foreign policy, and it is to this
subject that Franck and Weisband address themselves.
Foreign Policy by Congress is a difficult book for
a reviewer to summarize -- though an easy and enjoyable
one to read -- because the text interweaves detailed pre-
sentation of factual material with related exercises of
political analysis. The difficulty is compounded by
the fact that the political analysis is sometimes simply
an evaluation of American political institutions as
they are, while at other times it is an argument for how
they should be. In broad terms, Franck and Weisband
are concerned with the institutional capacity of Congress
to participate in foreign policy-making in the after-
math of the reforms that resulted from the perceived
presidential abuses associated with Vietnam and Watergate.
That these reforms have been profound and not merely
cosmetic in their effectis apoint that the book makes
incontestably clear.
The principal value of Foreign Policy by Congress
lies in its rigorous presentation of a wealth of factual
material and,of course, in the lessons that can be drawn from
this material. The bulk of the book is devoted to
detailed case studies of congressional efforts to in-
fluence foreign policy, including congressional actions
to end the war in Vietnam, legislative reversal of
presidential policies towards Turkey and Angola, the
passage of the War Powers Act, the assumption of an
oversight role over the intelligence agencies, and the
assertion of congressional control over policies re-
garding human rights, military aid, and the export of
nuclear technology and material. It is unnecessary to
summarize these case studies here, but it should be noted
that the authors present them in a manner that is not
only thorough and rigorous but also literate and inter-
esting, even exciting, to the reader. The authors'
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command of the factual material they present is
genuinely awesome, and they often flesh out their
account by providing "behind the scenes" information
that is helpful and frequently entertaining.3 It is
from these case studies and from the detailed descrip-
tions of congressional institutions and practices pro-
vided in the final chapters of the book that a picture
of the institutional capacities of Congress emerges.
The traditional view among political scientists
has been that Congress lacks the policy-making resources
to play a responsible role in the formulation of foreign
policy and that this lack of resources, along with
diffuseness of the legislative decision-making process,
relegates Congress to the role of ratifying or incremen-
tally modifying executive policies. The material that
Franck and Weisband provide demonstrates that this view
is probably anachronistic. The most dramatic change
has been in the area of expertise. Congress has ex-
panded its informational support services, has enlarged
committee staffs and improved their quality, and, through
trips abroad by legislators and staff members and con-
tacts with lobbyists for foreign governments, has es-
tablished a sort of shadow State Department that can
collect its own foreign affairs information. The
result of this growth of expertise is that "(c)hairmen,
and even individual members, are now more often in a
position to challenge Administration officials with
independently obtained facts and statistics as well
as with their own informed analyses of tle facts'
significance for the national interest."" Furthermore,
as Congress enhances its own informational resources,
it becomes all the more capable of prying information
out of the executive branch -- a development that is
reinforced by the fact that foreign policy professionals
now envision in their career patterns the possibility
of switching between the State Department and the staffs
of congressional foreign policy committees.
3. To cite one amusing if somewhat trivial example, Franck and
Weisband in describing the lobbying efforts of the executive branch to
gain ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty note that Ambassador Sol
Linowitz played tennis with Senator Zorinsky and purposely allowed the
Senator to win. Franck & Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress 277 (1979)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
4. P. 233.
1979] 239
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Similarly, changes in the legislative process with-
in Congress have also reduced some of the organizational
ineffeciencies that used to undermine legislative
participation in the making of foreign policy. Congres-
sional reforms in the last decade have reduced the power
of committee chairmen and generally "democratized" the
committee system. While the reforms themselves produce
certain dysfunctionalities, the result has been some
increase in the influence of committees due to their
newly enhanced legitimacy. This influence is, of course,
further strengthened by the growth of committee expertise.
The result, as Franck and Weisband suggest, is that
committees are seen as both more representative and more
expert, and their recommendations are in this respect
all the more likely to be adopted by the legislature
as a whole. In a variety of ways Congress has also
tried to constrain the fragmenting influence of lobbyists.
One method, inspired by scandals such as "Koreagate,"
has been to enact measures designed to limit lobbying
abuses; another, described in an intriguing case study
of the formulation of anti-boycott legislation, has
been to force conflicting lobbyists to meet together
and hammer out mutually acceptable measures. The result
of all these developments is that Congress is more
likely to produce coherent and consistent policies and
that the Executive Branch no longer needs to be looked to
as the sole institution capable of ensuring rational con-
tinuity in American foreign policy.
Thus the picture that emerges from the material that
Franck and Weisband present is of a Congress far better
equipped to play a responsible role in the formulation
of foreign policy than traditionally expected. None-
theless, as the authors make clear, it is an institution
that still suffers from structural weaknesses that can
inject irrationalities into the policy-making process.
One example that is mentioned breifly in passing is
especially germane to the issue in Goidwater v. Carter;
namely, the differing institutional incentives between
the Senate and the House over the treaty-making power.
Since the House has no constitutional role to play in
the ratification of treaties, it is inclined to encourage
the President to expand the area of foreign relations
dealt with through executive agreements authorized
by statute and not to requirg that international agreements
be formalized into treaties. Conversely, the Senate,
5. In a clever turn of phrase, the authors describe an executive
agreement as "an undeclared treaty which, like an undeclared war, seeks
to avoid paying its Constitutional dues by changing its name." P. 141.
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in pursuit of its own institutional self-interest, has
tended to insist on the use of treaties even for matters
that arguably are better left to the more flexible
instrument of the executive agreement.
More serious than differing interests between the
Senate and the House are irrationalities that stem from
conflicting committee jurisdictions. The authors are
especially critical of usurpation by congressional
appropriations and budgetary committees of matters that
ought to be left to the substantive foreign affairs
committees. 6 Similarly, the authors deplore the in-
consistencies that can result from legislative compromise
and from the impact of the procedural technicalities in-
volved in getting a bill through Congress. In this vein
the authors criticize the arms cutoff to Greece and Turkey,
which was the product of intense conflicts and compromises
both within Congress and between Congress and the
President:
What Congress and the President wrought
was, in fact, a go-stop-go policy towards
arms exports that succeeded only in
alienating both Greeks and Turks while
producing a policy ranking low in both
the scales of principle and pragmatism.7
Franck and Weisband are likewise critical of the Senate's
failure, due to wrangling and procedural technicalities,
to authorize the extension of SALT I until SALT II
negotiations were concluded. 8 At times the book assumes
an almost virulent tone in its criticisms of the effects
of congressional interference in foreign policy, as, for
examplewhen it notes that congressional actions with
respect to the war in Vietnam led to a situation where
ultimately "General Giap needed only to read the U.S.
statutes to know what to expec mandatory inaction." 9
While Franck and Weisband deplore the international
implications of some aspects of congressional activism,
they also recognize the positive side of recent develop-
ments. Indeed, for students of world public order, one of
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is its suggestion that Congress' new role in foreign
policy in many ways benefits American participation in
the international system. Franck and Weisband oberve
that
[What was once resisted as a dangerous
Congressional trespass on Executive pre-
rogatives has now been recognized as a
healthy reform of U.S. policy as well as
of Executive-Congressional relations.
Congressional codetermination has...
proven a better tactic than had been
expected by the practicioners of quiet
diplomacy. It is Congress which now
draws the ire of foreign dictators,
allowing the State Department to appear
more understanding in a global game of
"good cop-bad-cop"10
Similarly, the fact that foreign policy must now be
endorsed by both Congress and the President allows other
nations to have greater confidence in the seriousness
of America's commitment to its policy decisions. In-
deed, these perceived benefits have been a factor in
reducing executive branch resistance to congressional
assertions of power.
Thus the picture that Franck and Weisband present
is a balanced one, and the authors are careful not to
bludgeon the reader into either celebrating or deploring
Congress' new role in the making of foreign policy. Over-
all, where Foreign Policy by Congress is strongest is
in providing anecdotally rich and analytically rigorous
data about the nature and effects of the reforms that
have been instituted in the last decade. The analysis
is especially valuable in its recognition of the
interdependence of the various changes that have taken
place, cogently describing, as more legalistic studies
generally fail to do, the interplay among the growth
of expertise in congressional committees concerned
with foreign policy, the rise of lobbying by foreign
governments, and the decline of the traditional lead-
ership in Congress.
The book's major weakness is a direct counterpart
of its strengths: because it is factually dense and
because its focus is on the gamut of specific reforms,
10. P. 97.
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it does not provide an adequate general theoretical
basis to explain the broad changes in the distribution
of power between the legislative and executive branches.
Apart from a short introduction and brief remarks
scattered throughout the text, the authors' explanations
are typically on a "micro" level, usually in the form,
"This presidential action stimulated this response
by Congress." Little material is provided to explain
why legislators voted the way they did on specific
measures, and the authors resort instead to blithe
allusions to "this atmosphere of disaffection"ll or
"the rebellious mood of that era. ' 12 In the few places
that a broader and more rigourous theoretical view is
taken, the result, as shall be suggested below, is
not altogether satisfactory. It is, of course, some-
what unfair to criticize authors for not doing what
they did not (presumably) intend to do; yet from the
standpoint of a lawyer whose task to some degree is to
try to evaluate rules sub specie aeternitatis, the
failure of the authors to provide a long-term
theoretical framework in which to analyze the develop-
ments they describe represents the only major flaw to
an otherwise wholly admirable book.
In a short introduction, Franck and Weisband be-
gin their analysis by noting that throughout American
history there have been alternating periods of presi-
dential and congressional control over foreign policy
and that these periods have tended to fit three
generalizations:
(1) War tends to end the swing to Congress,
and the ending of a war tends to trigger the
swing back.
(2) Each swing contains within itself the
excesses that generate the counterforce for
the next swing.
(3) The durations of the swing, historically,
may be getting short. 13
No explanation is given for why these generalizations
have tended to hold true: in fact, the authors proceed
to argue that the most recent resurgence of the congres-
sional power is not to be seen as such a temporary "swing"
but rather as a "revolution," the effects of which may
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perspective to analyze the shift in power between the
branches and to identify the institutional virtues of
each branch, the authors rely recurrently on this ana-
logy to "revolution." While the analogy succeeds in
highlighting some significant developments and while
it enjoys a good deal of poetic force, its failure to
provide solid categories of analysis is suggested by
the following characteristic passage:
Revolutions occur when people lose patience
and, acting in anger, seize the controls. It
is not the preferred method of operating a
ship, although it may be the only way to deal
with madness or incompetence on the bridge.
It is in such a context that these events
in Congress must be understood. Had there
been a modicum of mutual respect and good
faith, the Congress would probably not have
acted as it did. It undoubtedly assumed
functions that it cannot, and theefore
should not even try to, 
perform. 14
Yet the crucial question is what functions Congress or
the Executive Branch should or should not perform, and
here the answers that the authors suggest, though sen-
sible, are cursory and superficial.15 The analogy to
revolution is not useful in this context, as what is
needed to identify the institutional capacities (and
incapacities) of Congress is a deeper theory of how the
institution operates.
In this respect, Foreign Policy by Congress is a
frustrating book. Although it supplies indispensable
factual data and case studies, all very competently
analyzed, from which a full theoretical explanation of
congressional competence could be generated, the authors'
occasional efforts in this direction remain tentative and
unconvincing. "What is appropriate to each branch," they
suggest, "is usually discernible by looking at the
instruments available to it. Congress acts by making
law. Law is a vehicle of predictive certainty, the
antithesis of flexibility and creative uncertainty.''16
14. P. 32.
15. The passage just quoted is followed by the simple but not
very useful suggestion that Congress should determine broad foreign
policy goals and methods to achieve them but should not supervise or in-
terfere with day-to-day decisionmaking. P. 32. The problem, of course,
is how the legislature can mandate methods to achieve goals without
excessively interfering in executive decisionmaking.
16. P. 32.
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Accordingly, the authors conclude that Congress has
a positive role to play in foreign-policymaking when
certainty is needed, while the executive should be
looked to when flexibility is required.
This wisdom is as old as The Federalist Papers and
as venerable, but it is not clear that when applied to
today's government it does not conceal as much as it
reveals. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest
that the executive branch is not nearly so flexible as
it is often presumed to be; bureaucratic entrenchment
and inertia often lead to the perpetuation of policies
long after they become instrumentally dysfunctional.
17
Similarly, the use of its law-making power may no longer
be the prime modality through which Congress exercises its
power.lB As the unfolding of the Watergate crisis il-
lustrates (where the exercise of Congress' law-making
power did not play a significant role), Congress has
available to it a number of devices such as the confir-
mation power and the power to investigate that can be
used to control executive branch policy-making. Theory
must go beyond the lessons of The FederaZist Papers or
analogies to "revolution" to provide a convincing eva-
luation of the merits of congressional participation in
the making of foreign policy. While one can draw con-
clusions about the institutional capacities of Congress
from the case studies that Franck and Weisband provide,
such conclusions must remain tentative--as being possibly
nothing more than the haphazard result of particular
problems and personalities--unless a deeper theoretical
framework of analysis is supplied.
It is, of course, no easy task to discover a sat-
isfactory theory to explain the intricacies of congres-
sional behavior. Such a theory would have to encompass
a consideration of the institutional and organizational
constraints on Congress, of the legislative role in
formulating domestic as well as foreign policy, of Con-
gress' various formal and informal powers, and of the
pressures and concerns that motivate the actual members
of Congress. Furthermore, with respect to foreign policy,
such a theory would have to explain why Congress seemed
so intent on abdicating its power to the President during
most of the post-World War Two period, only to assert
17. See, for example, Allison, Essence of Decision (1971) and
Neustadt, Alliance Politics (1970).
18. See Huntington, Congressional Responses to the Twentieth
Century in The Congress and America's Future (2nd ed. D. Truman 1973).
1979]
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itself with almost reckless abandon during the post-
Vietnam era. The literature in political science
suggests that there are underlying consistencies in
legislative behavior that can help resolve such seeming
anomalies. Especially suggestive in the context is
David Mayhew's analysis of Congress from the perspective
of its "electoral connection."' 9 Mayhew demonstrates
how both the structure and output of Congress can be
explained by focusing on the efforts of members to ensure
their reelection. Though this is not the place to
elaborate such a theory, it is clear that much of Mayhew's
analysis (such as his concept of "credit-claiming" or
his suggestion that legislative behavior can be seen as
a conspiracy among incumbents to help each other keep
their seats) can profitably be applied to explaining
congressional participation in the foreign-policy-
making process. Franck and Weisband's failure to pro-
vide such analysis deprives their conclusions of weight
they might otherwise have.
The theoretical failings on the part of Foreign
PoZicy by Congress are all the more regrettable in light
of the penetrating insights that the book offers into
how the policy-making process actually works. The authors
are remarkably sensitive to the effects of organizational
variables on policy outputs, and the comprehensiveness
of their institutional analysis is exemplary. On the
level of analysis at which they choose to operate, the
authors are careful to touch all bases--their thorough-
ness is evident, for example, in the range of reasons
they offer to support their assertion that the recent
changes in the congressional role in making foreign
policy are likely to be permanent. These reasons in-
clude 1) that Congress has mandated procedural changes
in policy-making rather than simply insisting on par-
ticular substantive outcomes, 2) that Congress has
restructured itself to provide its own autonomous policy-
making capability, 3) that Congress has changed its
own legislative procedures to reduce its dependence
on particular congressional leaders and to disperse
power to the rank-and-file of its members, 4) that
legislators have become less insulated from pressures
by constituents and lobbyists on foreign policy matters
as a result of the growing politicization of these
issues, 5) that the Executive Branch has restructured
itself to accommodate congressional participation in
foreign-policymaking, and 6) that the perceived bene-
19. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (1974).
[VOL. 6
CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY
fits of congressional participation in policy formula-
tion have increased while the feared costs have been lower
than expected.2 0 Even if one remains skeptical about the
permanence of these changes, the authors cannot be faulted
for failing to support their argument.
It is worth reiterating that a general theme behind
the author's analysis is that congressional insistence
on inflexible normative principles enshrined in law
may unduly restrict executive discretion and pragmatism.
The authors advocate that a sensible balance between
these two elements be achieved, and much of the material
they present suggests that both Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch have indeed made progress in creating such
a system. It is clear, of course, to even the most casual
observer of American politics that both branches have their
flaws and that what is needed is a mode of executive-
legislative interaction that minimizes these flaws without
impeding the exercise of each institution's virtues.
The material provided in Foreign Policy by Congress offers
grounds to believe that the last ten years have seen marked
progress in this direction. If such is the case, history
may someday rule that the Supreme Court was wise in Goldwater
v. Carter not permanently to "constitutionalize" a process
that must respond to the unpredictable and ever changing
demands of international politics and that the Court was
correct in consigning the question of who may terminate
treaties to the constantly evolving interaction between
Congress and the President.
20. Pp. 6-8.
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